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 1 
Abstract [197 words] 
A growing body of research has examined how people judge the persistence of identity 
over time — that is, how they decide that a particular individual is the same entity from 
one time to the next. While a great deal of progress has been made in understanding the 
types of features that people typically consider when making such judgments, to date, 
existing work has not explored how these judgments may be shaped by normative 
considerations. The present studies demonstrate that normative beliefs do appear to play 
an important role in people’s beliefs about persistence. Specifically, people are more 
likely to judge that the identity of a given entity (e.g., a hypothetical nation) remains the 
same when its features improve (e.g., the nation becomes more egalitarian) than when its 
features deteriorate (e.g., the nation becomes more discriminatory). Study 1 provides a 
basic demonstration of this effect. Study 2 shows that this effect is moderated by 
individual differences in normative beliefs. Study 3 examines the underlying mechanism, 
which is the belief that, in general, various entities are essentially good. Study 4 directly 
manipulates beliefs about essence to show that the positivity bias regarding essences is 
causally responsible for the effect. 
 
 
Keywords: Concepts; essentialism; normative factors; identity; persistence; true self; 
morality 
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This paper is concerned with how people determine the persistence of identity 
over time — that is, how they decide that an individual entity at t0 is the same individual 
at t1.  For example, suppose we start out with a specific scientific paper, Paper X, and then 
begin revising it in a way that changes some properties of the paper. Certain properties 
will be regarded as inessential, and if we change those aspects, people should think that 
the resulting document is still Paper X. By contrast, other aspects of the paper will be 
regarded as absolutely essential, and if we change those, people should think that the 
resulting document is not truly Paper X at all. 
Clearly, these judgments will be affected by a variety of different considerations, 
but the aim of the present studies is to explore one particular effect: Specifically, we 
demonstrate that people’s intuitions in cases like this are influenced by the normative 
status of the properties themselves. That is, when reasoning about many different types of 
entities, people are inclined to view the properties of an entity that they regard as 
normatively good as most essential. In turn, if those normatively good properties are 
changed in some way, observers are more likely to judge that the entity has ceased to 
exist compared to when analogous changes occur to properties that are seen as 
normatively bad. 
Individual Essence 
While there have been several theories proposed in metaphysics about what 
should constitute identity (in a normative sense), here our focus is descriptive. In other 
words, we focus on the criteria that everyday people use when making persistence 
judgments. Consider an example from the ancient thought experiment of Plutarch 
(1655/1839–1845), known as the ‘Ship of Theseus.’ Readers are asked to imagine a ship 
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that, throughout its voyage, begins to decay. Each plank is replaced with a new one, until 
eventually, the ship is entirely composed of new parts. The question is whether this ship 
is still the ‘Ship of Theseus.’ 
At first blush, one might think that a relatively straightforward way of 
approaching questions such as this would simply be to tally up all of the features at t0 and 
all of the features at t1 and assess the overall degree of similarity between them —
presumably, if the two objects are sufficiently similar, an observer might conclude that 
they are in fact, the same.  
However, a growing literature within psychology and philosophy suggests that 
people’s judgments in these cases are much more nuanced (for a review, see Rips, Blok, 
& Newman, 2006). One fact that emerges from this literature is that people do not seem 
to treat all features equivalently. Instead, they seem to prioritize deep, sometimes 
unobservable, characteristics over more surface attributes (e.g., Blok, Newman, & Rips, 
2005; Hall et al., 2003; Newman, Bartels, & Smith, 2014a). Consider a study by Blok, 
Newman, Behr and Rips (2001). One set of participants read about a male accountant 
Jim, who underwent plastic surgery to resemble Marsha, a female actress. The other set 
of participants read a similar story in which Jim’s brain was replaced with Marsha’s. 
Both groups then reported whether the individual was still Jim or had become Marsha 
after the surgery. A significantly greater proportion of participants in the Brain 
Transplant group believed Jim’s identity had changed than in the Plastic Surgery group 
(45% and 15%, respectively). Although intuitive, these results highlight the fact that 
people will often overlook perceptual similarity in favor of ‘deeper’ characteristics when 
making judgments of persistence.  
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A similar effect is observed among young children. For example, Hall, Waxman, 
Brédart, & Nicolay (2003) introduced three and four-year olds to an entity that was 
described in terms of a particular surface feature (a red colored character, named ‘Mr. 
Red’). Children were then told that the entity underwent a transformation that eliminated 
this very feature (it was painted green). However, despite this feature change, the 
majority of children reported that the entity was still Mr. Red, indicating that like adults, 
children seem to assign identity to something other than an entity’s appearance.  
One explanation for these patterns is that when assessing the persistence of 
individual entities, adults and young children alike tend to prioritize features that are seen 
as causally central (Rips, Blok, & Newman, 2006; Rips & Hespos, in press). For 
example, when reasoning about the persistence of persons, people weight the continuity 
of the brain and one’s memories (Blok, Newman, & Rips, 2005; see Johnson, 1990 for a 
similar result with school-age children), when reasoning about animals like lions and 
tigers, people prioritize the continuity of the animal’s internal stuff (Newman, Herrmann, 
Wynn, & Keil, 2008; Rips, Blok, & Newman, 2006), and when reasoning about physical 
objects like icebergs and rivers (Rips, Blok, & Newman, 2006; Rips & Hespos, in press), 
people incorporate relevant causal knowledge about those entities (e.g., how rivers flow 
and plausible changes in direction). 
In the present studies, however, we explore an altogether different type of feature 
that may influence people’s identity judgments. Specifically, we explore whether valence 
— that is, whether valuing certain traits as good vs. bad — similarly influences 
persistence judgments. For example, are people more likely to conclude that an object is 
the ‘Ship of Theseus’ when the ship becomes normatively better (e.g., it improves) than 
 5 
when it becomes normatively worse (e.g., it deteriorates)? It might seem strange to even 
ask whether valence can influence something as concrete as whether an object is 
considered the same individual. And yet, a growing body of research suggests that 
people’s value judgments can actually influence their intuitions about all sorts of matters, 
which, on the surface, appear to have nothing to do with values (see Knobe 2010).  
Individual Essence and Normative Belief 
One insight into the role of normative judgments comes from existing work on the 
way people think about the essences of human beings. Recent studies on people’s 
intuitions about individual human beings suggest that people tend to believe that the most 
essential properties of humans are their moral properties (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). 
For example, in one study, participants were asked to consider a person named John who 
had various properties. When participants were told that he lost non-moral properties 
(certain preferences, perceptual capacities, etc.), they tended to conclude that he was still 
John. By contrast, when he lost moral properties, observers concluded that the resulting 
person was no longer John (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014).  
Within the existing literature, this effect has been characterized by saying that 
people regard moral traits as lying at the essence of the self (Strohminger & Nichols, 
2014). We follow that terminology here. Thus, we will be using the word ‘essence’ to 
pick out something that people attribute to individuals (rather than to categories) and that 
explains the special priority they assign to moral traits in persistence judgments. (In the 
General Discussion, we explore the question as to whether this notion might be related in 
some way to the phenomenon of psychological essentialism found in representations of 
categories; e.g., Medin & Ortony, 1989). 
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Additional research has shown that beyond considering a person’s moral qualities, 
people tend to say that the most essential properties are those that are normatively good 
(De Freitas et al., 2015; Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014b; Newman, De Freitas, & 
Knobe, 2015). For example, when participants are told about a human being who has 
both good and bad moral properties, they tend to say that the good properties constitute 
the human being’s ‘true self’ (De Freitas et al., 2015; Newman et al., 2014b). In turn, this 
positivity regarding the essence of others appears to have a host of downstream 
consequences for judgments about questions such as whether the person is truly happy, or 
whether they have shown weakness of will (Newman et al., 2015).   
To date, these effects have largely been understood as resulting from the way in 
which people are inclined to think about human beings specifically. For example, one 
explanation for this effect is that people believe that deep down, other people are 
fundamentally good because this belief serves an adaptive function in encouraging 
cooperation (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Believing the best about others’ essential 
nature would seem to encourage a host of prosocial behaviors.  Clearly, however, people 
do not have to cooperate with entities such as ships or science papers, so for that reason it 
is certainly plausible that the positivity bias regarding essence arises only for judgments 
about individual human beings. 
Yet an alternative possibility is that this phenomenon reflects a more general role 
of normative evaluation in beliefs about individual concepts — one that extends even to 
entities other than individual persons.  For example, just as people think that the morally 
good parts of a human being are the most essential, they might think that the scientifically 
good parts of a paper are the most essential. Note that if this is indeed true, then it 
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suggests that moral traits per se are not necessarily the only traits that are seen as 
essential. Rather, it would simply be that moral traits are the most relevant positive traits 
in the case of human beings, but that other kinds of positive traits are more relevant in the 
case of other entities.  
In support of this prediction, developmental work has found that children think 
that properties such as poor eyesight or a missing finger will spontaneously improve over 
time (Lockhart, Chang, & Story, 2002), which might reflect an early tendency within folk 
biology to regard the good properties of the body as most essential. The real test of this 
hypothesis, however, is whether people’s intuitions about ubiquitous entities other than 
individual human beings — such as institutions, groups, and texts — actually do show 
the same basic pattern observed for intuitions about individual human beings. For 
example, are people more inclined to say that the identity of a scientific paper changes 
when it loses its most scientifically valuable sections? Is a rock band less likely to be 
considered ‘the same’ when it stops performing the songs that are regarded as 
aesthetically good?  
The Present Studies 
Study 1 demonstrates a basic asymmetry effect in which observers perceive that 
removing good properties is more disruptive to identity than removing bad properties. 
Study 2 tests whether this asymmetry is based on people’s own particular values about 
what constitutes the good vs. bad properties of an entity, suggesting that the effect does 
not arise only for certain types of entities or particular transformations. Study 3 confirms 
that these asymmetric judgments based on valence are driven by beliefs about the entity’s 
‘essence,’ while ruling out an alternative possibility based on whether the entity is viewed 
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as continually belonging to the same category. Study 4 directly manipulates beliefs about 
essence to show that this normative essentialism does in fact causally affect persistence 
judgments.1 
Study 1: Basic Effect 
Methods 
320 participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, and 86 
participants were excluded for failing to answer comprehension questions correctly, 
yielding a final sample of 234 participants (Mage = 30, 32% female). However, for all 
studies, including all participants does not alter the results. Participants were assigned to 
one of ten conditions in a 2 (valence: improvement vs. deterioration) X 5 (vignette) 
design. The vignettes described an entity that either improved or deteriorated (see 
Appendix A for all materials). To ensure that people thought the good and bad properties 
were equally intended, we included explicit information about intentionality and 
described the conditional change as going from a majority good (bad) to a majority bad 
(good). For example, “In the majority of its regions the local government intentionally 
teaches people to express their opinions freely in public… Now, in the majority of 
regions the local government intentionally teaches people to discriminate against one 
                                                
1 Two pilot studies are not reported in the current manuscript. The first found the same 
significant results as Study 1, but was not included since the vignettes were less 
controlled; for example, they did not explicitly state that intentionality was constant 
across conditions, and the proportion of traits before and after the described changes was 
somewhat ambiguous. The second study replicated the basic pattern of Study 4, but not as 
convincingly: when participants were directly told that the essence of the entity was bad, 
then the direction of identity judgments did reverse (as predicted), but not significantly so 
(although we did still find a significant interaction between condition and the essence 
manipulation). We believe this may be because the phenomenon observed in the current 
experiments — that people have a default tendency to attribute positive traits to essences 
— worked against the manipulation in this study, which should have used ‘badder’ traits. 
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another for being different.” The different vignettes served merely as a robustness check, 
and included a band, science paper, nation, university, and conference.  
Note that although some of the vignettes described the physical replacement of an 
entity’s parts, these changes were always held constant across the two conditions, with 
the only difference between conditions being the direction of valence change (i.e., good 
to bad vs. bad to good). Furthermore, in the nation vignette there was no physical 
replacement of parts at all (the government merely changed its teachings in some 
regions). Finally, another way in which the current changes were different from the kind 
of change employed in Ship of Theseus-like thought experiments is that they involved 
replacing the current parts with completely different parts (i.e. bad vs. good), rather than 
with newer versions of the old parts (Plutarch, 1655/1839–1845). 
Participants were then asked to rate, using a 1-7 scale, the extent to which they 
agreed with a question about identity persistence (1 = Completely disagree, 4 = Neither 
agree nor disagree, 7 = Completely agree): 
 
The [Bellshore] after the changes is not really the same country as the [Bellshore] before 
the changes.  
 
 Participants also responded to a second counterbalanced item: 
 
Person A thinks that [Bellshore] after the changes is still the same [country] as 
[Bellshore] before the changes.  
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Person B thinks that it makes more sense to say that [Bellshore] is no longer the same 
[country] it used to be. The way he sees it, the original [Bellshore] no longer exists.  
 
Who do you agree with more, Person A or Person B? 
 
They rated their agreement using a 1-7 scale (1 = Person A, 4 = Equally agree 
with both persons, 7 = Person B). We used a gradable measure rather than a forced-
choice measure in order to gain the required sensitivity to compute mediation and 
moderation analyses in later experiments. Notice that what was gradable was just the 
level of participants’ agreement with the persistence statement. In other words, if a 
participant gives a rating of 4 to the persistence statement, it would not be that this 
participant necessarily thinks that an object is only persisting to a certain degree. Rather, 
it could be that they are just agreeing to a certain degree with the claim that the object 
persists. (For example, it could be that they are certain that the object either persists or 
does not persist, but they are just not sure which.) Therefore, this measure can still be 
interpreted as tapping into intuitions about identity, with different ratings reflecting 
different degrees of agreement with the provided identity statements.  
Finally, participants completed two comprehension checks (see Appendix A for 
both questions).  
Results and Discussion 
The two items measuring persistence intuitions showed high internal consistency 
(α = 0.81), and were averaged to produce a single measure. As predicted, a 2 (valence: 
improvement vs. deterioration) X 5 (vignette) ANOVA revealed that participants were 
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more likely to agree that the entity’s identity changed when it deteriorated (M = 5.67, SD 
= 1.18), than when it improved (M = 4.99, SD = 1.38), F(1, 224) = 19.24, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.079. There was also a main effect of vignette, F(4, 224) = 4.86, p < .01, ηp2 = .080. 
However, this factor did not interact with valence, F(4, 224) = 1.23, p = .301, ηp2 = 021.  
All vignettes were directionally consistent with our hypothesis (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Persistence ratings for each condition of each vignette in Study 1. Scores are 
reverse coded such that higher values indicate higher identity persistence. Error bars 
show 95% CI. 
Study 2: The Role of Values 
The results of Study 1 were consistent with the notion that even for entities such 
as institutions, groups, and texts, people tend to view the normatively good properties as 
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most essential. As a result, they are more likely to judge that the entity has remained the 
same when the entity’s features improve than when the features deteriorate.  
People, however, sometimes have very different values about the same thing. This 
observation naturally gives rise to another prediction from our theory: when people value 
opposing characteristics in the same entity, they should exhibit correspondingly different 
views about whether an increase or decrease in each characteristic constitutes an 
improvement or a deterioration, which in turn, should influence their intuitions about 
persistence. Note that we are predicting different identity judgments about the very same 
scenarios, depending only on differences in participants’ own values. Thus, beyond 
demonstrating this phenomenon in a new way, the current study provides an important 
test that the asymmetries observed in Study 1 are not unique to, for example, certain 
types of entities or particular transformations.   
 To test this, Study 2 exploited differences in values between liberals and 
conservatives (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). We predicted an interaction effect 
whereby liberals would be more likely to say that the entity’s identity had changed when 
it acquired “conservative” properties, while conservatives would be more likely to say 
that the entity’s identity had changed when it acquired “liberal” 
 properties.  
Methods 
320 participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, and 76 
participants were excluded for failing to answer comprehension questions correctly, 
yielding a final sample of 244 participants (Mage = 46, 38% female). This study used a 
mixed-model design with change (toward conservative vs. toward liberal) as a between-
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subject factor and vignette as a within-subject factor. So each participant judged two 
vignettes, which served as a robustness check, and the two vignettes were always in the 
same condition — either changing toward liberal or conservative. For the two conditions 
of a particular vignette, the first portion of the vignette was always exactly the same. 
Then, the entity was described as changing in either a more liberal direction or a more 
conservative direction (see Appendix B for all materials).  
Participants then received the same identity measure from Study 1, in which two 
people disagree about whether the entity is still the same after the changes. They also 
indicated their political orientation (1 = liberal, 7 = conservative), and answered two 
comprehension questions about each vignette.  
Results and Discussion 
For our initial analyses, we used the mean of the responses to the two vignettes, 
yielding a single persistence score for each participant. We then conducted a linear 
regression analysis with condition, political orientation, and the interaction between 
condition and political orientation as factors. This analysis indicated a significant 
interaction between condition and political orientation, β = -.24, SE = 0.07, p < .001, such 
that political orientation moderated the effect of condition on persistence judgments. 
After running this first regression, we then ran two separate regressions, in which we 
regressed identity judgments on political orientation for each of the valence conditions 
respectively. In the ‘change toward liberal’ condition, conservatives were significantly 
more likely than liberals to say the identity was lost, r = .25, p = .016, while in the 
‘change toward conservative’ condition, liberals were significantly more likely than 
conservatives to say the identity was lost, r = -.24, p = .010. We also observed a main 
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effect of condition whereby participants were more likely to say identity changed when 
the organization became more conservative vs. more liberal, β = .32, SE = 0.11, p = .004. 
This result was likely due to a liberal leaning sample (M = 3.09, SD = 1.61; midpoint = 
4). There was no main effect of political orientation, β = .001, SE = 0.07, p = .984.  
As a robustness check, we repeated the same analyses for each of the two 
vignettes separately. For the conference vignette, we again observed a significant 
interaction between condition and political orientation, β = -.19, SE = 0.09, p = .031, a 
significant main effect of condition, β = .46, SE = 0.15, p = .002, and no main effect of 
political orientation, β = .03, SE = 0.09, p = .740. Furthermore, in the ‘change toward 
liberal’ condition, conservatives were marginally more likely than liberals to say the 
identity was lost, r = .22, p = .103, while in the ‘change toward conservative’ condition, 
liberals were marginally more likely than conservatives to say the identity was lost, r = -
.16, p = .155. For the scout club vignette, we also observed a significant interaction 
between condition and political orientation, β = -.31, SE = 0.11, p = .005, but no 
significant main effect of condition, β = .20, SE = 0.17, p = .234, and no main effect of 
political orientation, β = -.03, SE = 0.11, p = .764. Furthermore, in the ‘change toward 
liberal’ condition, conservatives were marginally more likely than liberals to say the 
identity was lost, r = .28, p = .074, while in the ‘change toward conservative’ condition, 
liberals were significantly more likely than conservatives to say the identity was lost, r = 
-.34, p = .025. 
Study 3: Essence Mechanism 
Studies 1 and 2 assumed, in line with previous work, that persistence judgments 
about an entity can be used to reveal beliefs about what constitutes its essence: If the 
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removal of X properties disrupts identity judgments more so than the removal of Y 
properties, then X properties must be more essential (Blok et al., 2005; Hall et al., 2003; 
Newman, Bartels, & Smith, 2014a; Rips, Blok, & Newman, 2006; Strohminger & 
Nichols, 2014). Study 3 sought to provide direct evidence that essentialism is driving the 
valence asymmetry in persistence judgments observed in Studies 1 and 2 — i.e., that the 
valence effect is explained by a tendency to view positive properties as more essential to 
identity than negative properties. We also sought to rule out an alternative possibility, 
inspired by research demonstrating the importance of category membership for 
persistence judgments (e.g. Rhemtulla & Xu, 2007). For example, people may think that 
the very definition of what it is to belong to the category of a nation, band, etc. is spelled 
out in positive (rather than negative) properties. As a result, participants may have been 
less likely to say the entity was the same when it possessed negative properties simply 
because it was no longer seen as satisfying the definition of the category to which it 
previously belonged. To address this, Study 3 asked about both category membership and 
essence. 
Methods 
320 new participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, and 104 
participants were excluded for failing to answer comprehension questions correctly, 
yielding a final sample of 216 participants (Mage = 29, 30% female). The design was 
nearly identical to that of Study 1, except that we included two additional measures about 
category membership and essence. Following the persistence measure, participants rated 
their agreement (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree) with the following 
statements (order counterbalanced across subjects):  
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Plainly speaking, if you had to categorize [Bellshore] after the changes, you would say 
that it is a [country] (as opposed to another category, such as an animal, car, fruit, et 
cetera).  
 
[Bellshore] after the changes no longer reflects the true essence of the original 
[Bellshore]. 
 
Previous studies have successfully employed this kind of wording to probe intuitions 
about essence (e.g. Newman et al., 2014b; Newman et al., 2015). Finally, participants 
completed comprehension questions about the vignette. 
Results and Discussion 
A 2 (valence: improvement vs. deterioration) X 5 (vignette) ANOVA again 
revealed that participants were significantly more likely to agree that the entity’s identity 
had changed when it deteriorated (M = 5.58, SD = 1.45) than when it improved (M = 
4.58, SD = 1.87), F(1, 206) = 19.95, p < .001, ηp
2 = .088. There was no effect of vignette, 
F(4, 206) = 1.98, p = .099, ηp2 = .037, and no valence x vignette interaction, F(4, 206) = 
2.56, p = .456, ηp2 = .017 .  
To determine whether beliefs about essence explain the effect of valence on 
identity ratings — that is, to determine the extent to which condition influences identity 
judgments through the mediator variable, essence — we conducted a multiple mediation 
bootstrap analysis (Hayes, 2012; Preacher & Hayes, 2008), with condition as the 
independent variable, ratings of identity persistence as the dependent variable, and 
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measures of essence (M = 4.51, SD = 1.66; midpoint = 4) and category membership (M = 
6.51, SD = 1.03; midpoint = 4) as potential mediators. This analysis indicated that 
essence did indeed significantly mediate the effect of valence on identity judgments (95% 
CI = -1.2 to -.57), whereas category membership did not (95% CI = -.05 to .12; see 
Figure 2, and Table 1 for variable means). Therefore, intuitions about essence appear to 
explain the asymmetric effect of valence on judgments of object identity. Tests indicated 
that multicollinearity between the identity and essence variables was not a concern (r < 
.8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mediation results from Study 3, showing standardized coefficients. Scores are 
reversed coded such that higher values indicate higher identity persistence. *p < 0.5; 
***p < .001.  
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Table 1. Results for Experiments 3 and 4. Mean Scaled Ratings (SDs in parentheses) and 
Variable Correlations 
 
Experiment 3 
Variables Scaled Ratings Correlations 
 Deterioration Improvement 1 2 3 
1. Identity 5.58 (1.45) 4.58  (1.87) --   
2. Essence 5.36 (1.37) 3.73 (1.51) 0.510** --  
3. Category 6.34 (1.16) 6.67 (.853) 0.052 -0.048 -- 
 
Experiment 4 
 Scaled Ratings  
 Good Essence  Bad Essence  Correlations 
Variables Deter Improv Deter Improv 1 2 3 4 
1. Identity 6.00 (1.29) 4.45 (1.87) 4.04 (2.08) 5.46 (1.39) --    
2. Essence 5.74 (1.40) 3.58 (1.86) 3.20 (1.86) 5.58 (1.41) 0.701** --   
3. Good Traits 1.97 (1.54) 6.31 (1.36) 1.62 (1.31) 6.32 (1.14) 0.006 0.018 --  
4. Bad Traits 6.34 (1.34) 1.75 (1.49) 6.55 (1.18) 1.69 (1.26) -0.011 -0.026 -0.926** -- 
 
Study 4: Causal Influence of Essence 
The final study sought to test whether essence is causally responsible for the 
effects observed here. We reasoned that even though people assume by default that the 
essence of an entity is good, if they are directly told that the essence of an entity is bad, 
then this should lead to a reversal in their intuitions about whether identity persists as a 
result of deterioration vs. improvement. In particular, a bad-essence entity that 
deteriorates should be seen as staying in line with its true essence, and so people should 
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be more inclined to say its identity is the same after the changes; by contrast, a bad-
essence entity that improves should be seen as deviating from its true essence, and so 
people should be more inclined to say its identity is not the same after the changes.  
Note that this study also provides an especially direct test of our hypothesis in that 
we are only manipulating whether the entity’s essence is initially described as good or 
bad. Further, such a design addresses two alternative explanations of our results. The first 
is that people are more inclined to say that identity changes after deterioration in order to 
communicate their disapproval of the negative resulting characteristics. Note that our 
prediction for the current study is that if an entity is described as having a bad essence, 
then people should be more inclined to say exactly the opposite: that its identity no longer 
exists after it improves.  
The second alternative explanation is that the valence asymmetry can be 
explained by the tainting quality of bad properties (Reeder, 1993; Reeder & Brewer, 
1979). On this account, any traits that are initially bad will irrevocably ‘contaminate’ an 
entity’s essence, such that subsequent improvements will not be able to shake the 
impression that the essence remains contaminated. As such, participants in our 
experiments may have been saying that an entity’s identity was still the same after 
improving because they viewed the entity as being irrevocably tainted from the start, 
rather than as always having a good essence. Yet notice again that we are making exactly 
the opposite prediction for the following study: if an essence is explicitly described as 
having a bad essence, it will be viewed as losing its identity if it improves; by contrast, 
the tainting account predicts that improvement will not change identity judgments for a 
tainted entity.  
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Methods 
640 participants (Mage = 34, 246 female) were recruited using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (essence: good vs. bad) x 2 
(valence: improvement vs. deterioration) design. Participants were shown a vignette 
about a fictional educational institute that existed during the Nazi regime, named the 
“Iserlohn Institute.” The institute was explicitly described as having either a good essence 
(teaching traditional academic ideals) or bad essence (teaching Nazi ideology): 
 
 During the Nazi regime, some educational institutions taught a mixture of courses on 
traditional academic subjects (science, literature, etc.) and courses in Nazi ideology 
(often with strong anti-Semitic messages). But the Iserlohn Institute was different. Even 
though it taught a mix of these two kinds of courses, everyone who enrolled could tell that 
the real essence of the institution was its focus on academic subjects like science and 
literature [Nazi ideology and anti-Semitism]. The material they taught on Nazi ideology 
[traditional academic subjects] was just a thin veneer over this more essential part of the 
curriculum.  
 
In order to determine whether we had successfully convinced participants that the 
essence of the institute was good or bad, we then asked them a manipulation check 
question, Based on this information, how would you characterize Iserlohn Institute’s 
“true essence”? (1 = Fundamentally bad, 7 = Fundamentally good).  
Next, participants read that the institute either deteriorated or improved: 
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…Then, after a number of years, there was a sudden administrative change. The 
rector of the institute was replaced by a new rector who decided to shake things up in 
certain ways. Specifically, the new rector decided to completely eliminate all courses on 
traditional academic subjects (science, literature, etc.) [Nazi ideology and anti-
Semitism]. Instead, from that day onwards the institute always taught courses in just Nazi 
ideology [traditional academic subjects]. 
 
Participants then completed a measure of identity (two people disagreeing about 
whether the entity was still the same institute after the changes). Afterwards participants 
were asked three questions (counterbalanced between subjects, with each question 
presented on separate pages) that we intended to use as potential mediator variables. The 
essence mediator asked participants how much they agreed (1 = Completely disagree, 7 = 
Completely agree) with the statement Iserlohn Institute after the changes no longer 
reflected the true essence of the original Iserlohn Institute. Since, based on the tainting 
account, the amount of good versus bad traits should predict people’s judgments (i.e., a 
tainted entity should be viewed as having more bad traits than good traits) we also 
included two other potential mediators that asked about the amount of bad traits and good 
traits remaining after the changes: After the changes, how much of the curriculum at 
Iserlohn Institute contained Nazi ideals [traditional academic pursuits]? (1 = None at 
all, 7 = A great deal). We predicted that the essence variable would mediate the effects, 
while these other variables would not. We did not include any comprehension questions, 
since the current study was already fairly long compared to the others, and in the previous 
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studies excluding participants based on comprehension questions did not have a 
qualitative effect on the overall statistical results.  
Results and Discussion 
Results from the manipulation check question indicated that we successfully 
manipulated essence judgments: participants were significantly more likely to rate the 
institute as good when they read the ‘good’ essence stem (M = 4.73, SD = 1.54) than the 
‘bad’ essence stem (M = 1.86, SD = 1.33), t(638) = 25.26, p = .002. 
Mean ratings on the persistence statement for each condition are displayed in 
Figure 3. A 2 (essence: good vs. bad) x 2 (valence: improvement vs. deterioration) 
ANOVA indicated a significant interaction between essence and valence, F(1, 636) = 
123.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. Consistent with our hypothesis, when the institute was 
described as having a good essence participants were significantly more likely to agree 
that the entity was no longer the same entity after it deteriorated (M = 6.00, SD = 1.29) 
than after it improved (M = 4.45, SD = 1.87), t(319) = 8.67, p < .001. Conversely, when 
the entity was described as having a bad essence, participants were more likely to agree 
that the entity’s identity was no longer the same after it improved (M = 5.46, SD = 1.39) 
than after it deteriorated (M = 4.04, SD = 2.08), t(320) = 7.17, p < .001.  
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Figure 3. Means by condition in Study 4. Scores are reverse coded such that higher 
values indicate higher identity persistence.  Error bars show 95% CI.  
 
To determine whether the interaction effect is explained by beliefs about essence 
— that is, to determine the extent to which the condition x essence interaction influences 
identity judgments through the essence mediator variable — we conducted a multiple 
mediation bootstrap analysis (Hayes, 2012; Preacher & Hayes, 2008), with the interaction 
as the independent variable, ratings of identity persistence as the dependent variable, and 
measures of 1) essence, and 2) the average of the amount of positive traits and (reverse-
coded) negative traits, since answers to these questions were highly correlated; see Table 
1. This analysis indicated that essence did indeed significantly mediate the effect of the 
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interaction on identity judgments (95% CI =  -.86 to -.63), whereas the effect was not 
mediated by the amount of good and bad traits after the changes (95% CI = -.003 to .01; 
see Figure 4, and Table 1 for variable means). Thus, we find no evidence in favor of the 
contamination account, while accumulating even more evidence for the essence account. 
Tests indicated that multicollinearity between the identity and essence variables was not a 
concern (r < .8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mediation results from Study 4, showing standardized coefficients. Scores are 
reverse coded such that higher values indicate higher identity persistence. ***p < .001.  
 
Taken together, these results indicate that attributions of individual essence have a causal 
impact on persistence judgments, and that individual essence attributions mediate the 
impact of valence on persistence judgments. 
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General Discussion 
Across four studies, people showed a bias toward believing that the core 
properties of entities are positive, and therefore they were more likely to say that an entity 
persisted if its properties improved (becoming normatively better) than if those properties 
deteriorated (becoming normatively worse). Study 1 demonstrated this basic effect for 
many different types of entities; Study 2 showed that these persistence judgments are 
moderated by individual differences in values; Study 3 provided direct evidence for the 
essence mechanism; and Study 4 demonstrated that manipulating beliefs about essence 
causally changes the nature of identity judgments. 
 
1. Relation to judgments about human beings 
Recall that earlier research indicates that normative considerations affect 
judgment about the essences of human beings (Newman et al., 2014b; 2015). At first, it 
might seem that this effect is unique to judgment about persons (e.g. Sears, 1983; Tobia, 
2015). However, the present results suggest that this effect actually extends to other 
entities like institutions, groups and texts. The good aspects of humans are seen as more 
essential, but so too are the good aspects of bands, science papers, universities, 
conferences, scout camps, and nations. This finding suggests that the effect of normative 
beliefs on persistence judgments is not something specific to beliefs about individual 
human beings. Instead, such normative considerations seem to reflect a more general 
mechanism. 
One might wonder whether the effect of valence on identity judgments is stronger 
for entities that are more human-like or person-like. This, however, does not appear to be 
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the case. For example, we conducted a post-test in which 64 participants rated how 
similar (1= Not at all, 7 = Very Similar) each entity was to a person, for example: How 
similar are [universities] to people? These anthropomorphism values were then 
correlated with the positivity biases (good > bad) for each of the entities in Experiments 1 
and 3. If the effect was stronger for person-like entities, we would expect to find a 
positive correlation. Yet we found a significant negative correlation for Experiment 1 (r = 
-.982, p = .003), and no significant correlation for Experiment 3  (r = -.751, p = .144).  
One question that has arisen from recent research is why people tend to believe 
the essence of other humans is good (Newman et al., 2014b; Newman et al., 2015). The 
present studies — and specifically, the analogous findings across humans, institutions 
and groups — provide insights regarding this question. For instance, one might initially 
suppose that we judge other people’s good traits as most essential because this has the 
specific function of fostering cooperation. But it is less plausible that people’s tendency 
to perceive entities such as bands and scout camps as essentially good is to be explained 
in terms of a tendency to cooperate with those entities. Similarly, we might long to 
believe that people are good “deep down” perhaps for optimistic, religious, or spiritual 
reasons, but it is less plausible that we hold out dearly for the good true soul of science 
papers.  
In light of the present studies, one plausible explanation is that the role of 
normative considerations is not merely a symptom of our desires, but instead, represents 
a basic fact about the cognitive processes involved in how we represent individual 
entities. In other words, in conceiving the core features of entities we may simply be 
prone to automatically apply our own normative judgments, such that our very 
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understanding of an entity’s identity is that it is consists of those traits that we value as 
good. 
 
2. Scope of the effect 
The current results suggest that previous findings — whereby positive moral traits 
are ascribed to the deepest aspects of individual human beings — also extend to 
judgments about entities of other types, such as group agents and institutions. But now 
one might wonder just how general this intuition is. Would it apply to entities of all types, 
or is it limited to certain kinds of entities?  
For example, suppose we had looked at judgments of ordinary artifacts, such as 
cars, chairs or houses. Would we still have found an effect such that these entities were 
judged to persist more in the improvement condition than in the deterioration condition? 
What if we had looked at biological kinds, such as animals or plants? Or what if we had 
looked at physical objects, such as rocks? 
We suspect that the effect observed here would arise for objects of some kinds but 
not others. This raises the question as to whether a more general theory can be developed 
to specify the conditions under which observers are likely to incorporate their own 
normative beliefs into their persistence judgments. While we view this as an important 
next step for future work (and one that would require focused empirical studies), we can 
offer a tentative proposal.  
Specifically, it may be that the types of normative effects observed here are most 
likely to arise in cases where there is believed to be some purpose or teleology of a 
particular entity.  Some things quite obviously have a telos or purpose (e.g., the purpose 
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of a fork is to help in eating), but research suggests people apply teleology more broadly 
(Kelemen, 1999; Kelemen and Rosset, 2009). Perhaps people believe that there is some 
sense in which the purpose of bands is to make meaningful music, the purpose of physics 
papers is to make valuable scientific contributions, and the purpose of human beings is to 
be morally good.  
If this hypothesis turns out to be correct, it would give us a way of understanding 
the scope of the effect observed here. Specifically, it might be that the effect arises only 
for entities that are seen as having a deeper purpose in this relevant sense. 
 
3. Existing research on identity 
In the Introduction, we discussed a body of research on the way people reason 
about the persistence of individuals over time (Blok et al., 2005; Hall et al., 2003; 
Newman et al., 2014a; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). A key insight from this work is 
that not all features are equally relevant in identity judgments. Instead, people seem to 
prioritize features of specific types. 
As we noted above, existing work suggests that people prioritize features that they 
deem to be causally central — e.g., a person’s brain, a lion’ innards, and so on (Blok et 
al., 2001; Blok et al., 2005; Johnson, 1990; Newman et al., 2008; Rips et al., 2006; Rips 
& Hespos, in press).  The present studies, however, examined a very different sort of 
phenomenon. People appear to have a bias toward believing that core properties of 
entities are normatively good (see especially Study 2). A question now arises about how 
to understand the relationship between these two effects. Are these simply unconnected 
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phenomena that both just happen to impact people’s intuitions about identity, or is there 
some way to unify them in a more general theory? 
While the existing data are not sufficient to answer this question, we think that 
there is in fact, reason to believe that these phenomena are importantly related. In a 
forthcoming paper, Rips and Hespos (in press) suggest that people understand the identity 
of objects in a way that involves going beyond their superficial features and searching for 
a deeper principle that allows one to make sense of these features. As they note, existing 
work shows that this can be done by identifying the causal forces that ‘unify and shape 
the object’ (Rips & Hespos, in press: [pg. 9]), but perhaps it can also be done by 
identifying a normative ideal that the object to some degree approximates. Clearly, these 
two notions are different in their specific content, but they appear to involve a similar sort 
of structure. Both involve a deeper principle that in one way or another allows us to make 
sense of the superficial features of the object and to unify them in a more coherent 
understanding of the object as a whole. We return to this issue briefly below. 
 
4. Relation to category essence 
The present studies explored people’s judgments about individual entities, and we 
therefore drew on the existing literature about how people understand such entities (Hall 
et al., 2003; Rips et al., 2006; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Within this literature, the 
features that are seen as required for the persistence of an individual entity are sometimes 
referred to as that entity’s ‘essence’ (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). 
It should be noted, however, that the majority of existing work on psychological 
essentialism has been concerned with a somewhat different topic. This work has been 
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concerned not with the essences of individual entities (e.g., the essence of an individual 
nation, the essence of an individual scientific paper), but rather with the essences of 
categories of entities (e.g., the essence of a species, the essence of a gender). For 
example, it has investigated how category membership is determined by beliefs about 
deep, causally central features (e.g., Keil, 1989) as well as similarity and physical 
appearance (e.g. Hampton, Estes, & Simmons, 2007; Hampton, Storms, Simmons, & 
Heussen, 2009). A question naturally arises therefore about whether the phenomena 
explored here are related in some way to questions about category essence.  
To begin with, we can easily rule out the most direct sort of relation. It would not 
be at all plausible to suggest that people think the essence of an individual entity simply 
is the essence of one of the corresponding categories. For example, our hypothetical 
physics paper ‘Atom Dynamics’ (from Study 1) is a member of various categories, 
including the category physics papers and the superordinate category scientific papers. 
Yet it would not be at all plausible to suggest that people see its individual essence (the 
essence of ‘Atom Dynamics’) as simply being identical to the essence of one of these 
categories (e.g., the essence of scientific papers). First, in Study 3, we find an effect that 
is mediated by judgments of individual essence but not by judgments of category essence. 
Second, the two notions seem to come apart quite clearly in cases in which an entity 
undergoes radical change. For example, suppose that someone removed almost all of the 
material from the paper ‘Atom Dynamics’ and gradually turned it into a paper about a 
completely different question in physics. Then the resulting entity might still retain the 
essence of scientific papers, but it would not retain the individual essence of this one 
particular paper. 
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A more plausible view would be that the study of individual essence is connected 
to the study of category essence at a more indirect level. Perhaps there are certain 
principles about the way people attribute essences, and these principles apply both to 
attributions of individual essence and to attributions of category essence. Then, if we 
discover something about the way people understand individual essences, it might be that 
the very same thing will apply to the way people understand category essences.  
Existing results do provide at least some indication that this may be the case. As 
we noted above, people’s intuitions about individual identity tend to prioritize features 
that are causally central (Blok et al., 2001; Blok et al., 2005; Johnson, 1990; Newman et 
al., 2008; Rips et al., 2006; Rips et al., 2006; Rips & Hespos, in press). Research on 
category essence has arrived at a parallel finding, showing that people’s intuitions about 
category essence tend to involve features that are causally central (e.g. Ahn et al., 2001; 
Bloom, 2004; Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1989). Similarly, the present studies show that 
intuitions about individual identity tend to prioritize features that are deemed normatively 
good. Intriguingly, some work points to a parallel effect for intuitions about categories, 
indicating that people show a tendency to regard normatively good features of categories 
as especially essential (Barsalou, 1985; Knobe, Prasada & Newman, 2013; Lynch, Coley 
& Medin, 2000). 
 In short, there is at least some potential for an even greater degree of theoretical 
unification here. We noted in the previous section that it might prove possible to develop 
a more abstract account that would give a unified explanation of the different effects 
observed for individual entities (causal centrality and normative goodness). The claim 
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now is that it might prove possible in turn to unify these effects with the parallel effects 
observed for judgments about categories. We are pursuing this topic in ongoing research.  
 
5. Conclusion 
At the beginning of this paper we posed a question about how people determine 
the persistence of an entity over time. Specifically, we asked whether this judgment is 
influenced by one’s normative views about the entity’s properties. Indeed, we found that 
people viewed normatively good properties as more essential than bad properties, such 
that removing the good properties was more likely to lead to the impression that the 
entity ceased to exist. Subsequent experiments confirmed that this asymmetric pattern of 
identity judgments was influenced by people’s individual values (rather than by 
superficial factors), and that intuitions about essence (rather than about categorization or 
contamination) were causally responsible for the effect.  
Extending previous work, these findings show that normative essentialism is 
applied not only to other humans, but also to institutions, groups and texts, influencing 
identity judgments for all these various entities. In short, people appear to have a much 
more general tendency to believe that the essence of an object is good.  
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Appendix A: Stimuli presented in Studies 1 and 3 
 
Country 
 
Bellshore is a small country. In the majority of its regions the local government 
intentionally teaches people to express their opinions freely in public, while in some other 
regions the local government intentionally teaches people to discriminate against one 
another for being different.  
Over the years, some regions of Bellshore change their policies. Now, after these 
changes, in the majority of regions the local government intentionally teaches people to 
discriminate against one another for being different. 
 
Bellshore is a small country. In the majority of its regions the local government 
intentionally teaches people to discriminate against one another for being different, while 
in some other regions the local government intentionally teaches people to express their 
opinions freely in public.  
Over the years, some regions of Bellshore change their policies. Now, after these 
changes, in the majority of regions the local government intentionally teaches people to 
express their opinions freely in public. 
 
Band 
 
Breath String is a four member band. When the group first began writing songs, the 
majority of their songs were intentionally deeply moving and meaningful, while some 
other songs were intentionally very superficial and commercial.  
Over the years, some of the original members left, and some new members joined. 
Now, after these changes, the majority of their songs are intentionally very superficial 
and commercial.  
 
Breath String is a four member band. When the group first began writing songs, the 
majority of their songs were intentionally very superficial and commercial, while some 
other songs were intentionally deeply moving and meaningful.  
Over the years, some of the original members left, and some new members joined. 
Now, after these changes, the majority of their songs are intentionally deeply moving and 
meaningful. 
 
Science Paper 
 
A physicist writes a physics article entitled Atom Dynamics. The majority of the 
theoretical points are intentionally very well supported by the data and follow naturally 
from the analyses, while some other theoretical points intentionally make very big claims 
that aren’t directly related to or supported by the data at all.  
The physicist then spends five hours editing the paper, removing some parts and 
adding some new parts. Now, after these changes, the majority of the theoretical points 
intentionally make very big claims that aren’t directly related to or supported by the data 
at all.  
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A physicist writes a physics article entitled Atom Dynamics. The majority of the 
theoretical points intentionally make very big claims that aren’t directly related to or 
supported by the data at all, while some other theoretical points are intentionally very 
well supported by the data and follow naturally from the analyses.  
The physicist then spends five hours editing the paper, removing some parts and 
adding some new parts. Now, after these changes, the majority of the theoretical points 
are intentionally very well supported by the data and follow naturally from the analyses.  
 
University 
 
Eastford is a large university. When the university first opened, the majority of its 
departments taught by intentionally using diverse teaching styles and really challenging 
students to think for themselves, while some other departments taught by intentionally 
reading straight out of a textbook and strictly not allowing any student participation 
during lectures.  
Over the years, some of the original departments were removed, and some new 
departments created. Now, after these changes, the majority of its departments teach by 
intentionally reading straight out of a textbook and strictly not allowing any student 
participation during lectures.  
 
Eastford is a large university. When the university first opened, the majority of its 
departments taught by intentionally reading straight out of a textbook and strictly not 
allowing any student participation during lectures, while some other departments taught 
by intentionally using diverse teaching styles and really challenging students to think for 
themselves.  
Over the years, some of the original departments were removed, and some new 
departments created. Now, after the changes, the majority of its departments teach by 
intentionally using diverse teaching styles and really challenging students to think for 
themselves.  
 
Conference 
 
Medline is an annual conference where professors get together to present their research. 
When the conference first began operating, the majority of its presentations were 
intentionally very helpful and relevant to current medical problems, while some other 
presentations were intentionally very commercial and not seriously aimed at addressing 
current medical problems. 
Over the years, some professors stopped attending the conference, and some new 
professors started attending. Now, after these changes, the majority of its presentations 
are intentionally very commercial and not seriously aimed at addressing current medical 
problems.  
 
Medline is an annual conference where professors get together to present their research. 
When the conference first began operating, the majority of its presentations were 
intentionally very commercial and not seriously aimed at addressing current medical 
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problems, while some other presentations were intentionally very helpful and relevant to 
current medical problems.  
Over the years, some professors stopped attending the conference, and some new 
professors started attending. Now, after these changes, the majority of its presentations 
are intentionally very helpful and relevant to current medical problems.  
 
Comprehension questions (using the country example) 
 
1) Before the changes, how would you describe Bellshore? 
 
• Mostly regions where people can express their opinions in public.  
• Mostly regions where people discriminate against one another for being different.  
• Some regions where people can express their opinions in public, and others where 
people discriminate against one another for being different.  
 
 2) After the changes, how would you describe Bellshore? 
 
• Mostly regions where people can express their opinions in public.  
• Mostly regions where people discriminate against one another for being different.  
• Some regions where people can express their opinions in public, and others where 
people discriminate against one another for being different.  
 
Appendix B: Stimuli presented in Study 2 
 
Scout Club 
 
Young Scouts is a scouting club that teaches survival and life skills. When the club first 
started, some trips intentionally included compulsory lessons about the necessity of being 
God-loving and a good Christian, while some other trips intentionally did not include 
these lessons at all.  
 
Over the years, the club removes some trips and adds some new ones. Now, after these 
changes, almost all of the trips intentionally include compulsory lessons about the 
necessity of being God-loving and a good Christian. 
OR 
Over the years, the club removes some trips and adds some new ones. Now, after these 
changes, almost all of the trips intentionally do not include any lessons whatsoever about 
being God-loving and a good Christian. 
 
Conference 
 
SciTech is a conference about the most urgent scientific and technological challenges 
facing our government. When the conference first began operating, some of the 
presentations were intentionally about the grave threat of climate change on the planet, 
while some other presentations were intentionally about the dire need to update military 
defense technology. 
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Over the years some presenters stopped attending the conference, and some new 
presenters started attending. Now, after these changes, almost all of the presentations are 
intentionally about the dire need to update military defense technology. 
OR 
Over the years, some presenters stopped attending the conference, and some new 
presenters started attending. Now, after these changes, almost all of the presentations are 
intentionally about the urgent threat of climate change on the planet.  
 
Author Note 
 
We thank Christina Starmans and Jillian Jordan for helpful comments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
References 
Ahn, W. K., Kalish, C., Gelman, S. A., Medin, D. L., Luhmann, C., Atran, S., ... & 
Shafto, P. (2001). Why essences are essential in the psychology of concepts. 
Cognition, 82, 59–69. 
Barsalou, L. W. (1985). Ideals, central tendency, and frequency of instantiation as 
determinants of graded structure in categories. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 11, 629–654. 
Blok, S., Newman, G., Behr, J., & Rips, L. J. (2001). Inferences about personal identity. 
In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science 
Society (pp. 80-85). 
Blok, S. V., Newman, G., & Rips, L. J. (2005). Individuals and their concepts. In W. K. 
Ahn, R. L. Goldstone, B. C. Love, A. B. Markman & P. Wolff (Eds.), 
Categorization inside and outside the lab. Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychological Association. 
Bloom, P. (2004). Descartes’ baby: How the science of child development explains what 
makes us human. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
De Freitas, J., Sarkissian, H., Grossman, I., De Brigard, F., Luco, A., Newman, G. E., & 
Knobe, J. (2015). Is there universal belief in a good true self? Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Gelman, S. A. (2003). The essential child: Origins of essentialism in everyday thought. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. (2009). Liberals and conservatives use different sets of 
moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96, 1029–1046. 
 38 
Hall, D. G., Waxman, S. R., Brédart, S., & Nicolay, A. C. (2003). Preschoolers' use of 
form class cues to learn descriptive proper names. Child Development, 74, 1547–
1560.  
Hampton, J. A., Estes, Z., & Simmons, S. (2007). Metamorphosis: Essence, appearance, 
and behavior in the categorization of natural kinds. Memory & Cognition, 35, 
1785–1800. 
Hampton, J. A., Storms, G., Simmons, C. L, and Heussen, D. (2009). Feature integration 
in natural language concepts. Memory & Cognition, 37, 1150–1163.  
Hayes, A. F. (2012) PROCESS: A versatile computational tool for observed variable 
mediation, moderation, and conditional process modeling [white paper]. 
Johnson, C. N. (1990). If you had my brain, where would I be? Children’s understanding 
of the brain and identity. Child Development, 61, 962–972.  
Keil, F. C. (1989). Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Kelemen, D. (1999). The scope of teleological thinking in preschool children. Cognition, 
70, 241–272. 
Kelemen, D., & Rosset, E. (2009). The human function compunction: Teleological 
explanation in adults. Cognition, 111, 138–143. 
Knobe, J. (2010). Person as scientist, person as moralist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
33, 315–329. 
Knobe, J., Prasada, S., & Newman, G. E. (2013). Dual character concepts and the 
normative dimension of conceptual representation. Cognition, 127, 242–257.   
Lockhart, K. L., Chang, B., & Story, T. (2002). Young children’s beliefs about the 
 39 
stability of properties: Protective optimism? Child Development, 73, 1408–1430.  
Lynch, E. B., Coley, J. D., & Medin, D. L. (2000). Tall is typical: Central tendency, ideal 
dimensions, and graded category structure among tree experts and novices. 
Memory & Cognition, 28, 41–50. 
Medin, D. L., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. 
Ortony (Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning. Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Newman, G. E., Bartels, D. M., & Smith, R. K. (2014, a). Are artworks more like people 
than artifacts? Individual concepts and their extensions. Topics in Cognitive 
Science, 6, 647–662. 
Newman, G. E., Bloom, P., & Knobe, J. (2014, b). Value judgments and the true self. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40, 203–216. 
Newman, G. E., De Freitas, J., & Knobe, J. (2015). Beliefs about the true self explain 
asymmetries based on moral judgment. Cognitive Science, 39, 96–125. 
Newman, G. E., Herrmann, P., Wynn, K., & Keil, F. C. (2008). Biases towards internal 
features in infants’ reasoning about objects. Cognition, 107, 420–432. 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for 
assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior 
Research Methods, 40, 879–891. 
Reeder, G. D. (1993). Trait-behavior relations and dispositional inference. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 586–593. 
Reeder, G. D., & Brewer, M. B. (1979). A schematic model of dispositional attribution in 
interpersonal perception. Psychological Review, 86, 61–79. 
 40 
Rhemtulla, M. & Xu, F. (2007) Sortal concepts and causal continuity: Comment on Rips, 
Blok, and Newman (2006). Psychological Review, 114, 1087–1094. 
Rips, L. J., Blok, S., & Newman, G. (2006). Tracing the identity of objects. 
Psychological Review, 113, 1–30. 
Rips, L., & Hespos, S. (in press). Divisions of the physical world: Concepts of objects 
and substances. Psychological Bulletin. 
Sears, D. O. (1983). The person positivity bias. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 44, 233–250. 
Strohminger, N., & Nichols, S. (2014). The essential moral self. Cognition, 131, 159–
171. 
Tobia, K. (2015). Personal identity and the Phineas Gage Effect. Analysis, 75, 396–405. 
 
